Six weeks of testimony shed light on the UK’s unpreparedness for COVID-19, revealing deep-seated issues tied to austerity, Brexit, and outdated planning.

After six weeks of intense hearings, the UK COVID-19 inquiry has exposed the country’s severe lack of preparedness for the pandemic. As the evidence unfolded, it became clear that the UK was caught off guard by the crisis. By March 2021, the nation had recorded over 180 COVID-related deaths per 100,000 people, a stark contrast to South Korea, which had just three. The families of the victims bluntly described the situation as “catastrophically unprepared.”

The inquiry, led by Lady Hallett, sought to understand why the UK was so vulnerable. Hugo Keith KC, the lead counsel, emphasized the unprecedented scale of disruption the pandemic caused. The inquiry revealed that the country’s readiness was significantly compromised by the combined effects of austerity policies and Brexit. Former Chancellor George Osborne vehemently rejected any link between austerity and the pandemic’s impact. Meanwhile, Michael Gove, a key figure in the Brexit campaign, argued that the government’s preoccupation with a no-deal EU exit had inadvertently made the UK more “match-fit” for the pandemic.

The structure of the government itself was also called into question. The UK’s pandemic preparedness plan was criticized for being fragmented and overly complex. An organizational chart shown during the hearings, dubbed the “bowl of spaghetti,” highlighted the confusion and lack of clear accountability in the government’s response.

A more fundamental question emerged: Did the UK prepare for the wrong kind of pandemic? The national risk register, which had been focused on the threat of a flu pandemic, was seen as inadequate for a novel virus like COVID-19. The government had made extensive plans for handling an influenza outbreak, including stockpiling antiviral drugs and focusing on morgue capacity. However, these plans didn’t account for the unique characteristics of COVID-19, particularly its asymptomatic transmission, which required mass testing and contact tracing.

Matt Hancock, who served as health secretary during the pandemic, admitted that the existing plans were “flawed.” He acknowledged that the focus had been on managing the aftermath of a pandemic, rather than preventing its disastrous effects in the first place. Yet, when Hancock was briefed upon taking office, he was only made aware of the flu-related stockpiles and not those for a non-influenza pandemic. The question remains: Why didn’t he push for the necessary preparations for such a crisis?